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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
TRESPASS-BASIS OF LIABILITY-DAMAGE CAUSED BY AERIAL
CROP SPRAYING.-Plaintiff brought an action of trespass
against a neighboring landowner for crop damage resulting
from the aerial application of chemicals over adjacent land.
The trial court rendered judgment adverse to plaintiff. On
appeal the Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case of first impres-
sion, held, one justice dissenting, that liability will be imposed
in a case of unintentional intrusion, only when damage arises
out of negligence or some extra hazardous activity and aerial
spraying of defoliant is such a hazardous activity. Loe v. Len-
hardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Ore. 1961).
At common law, every unauthorized entry upon the soil of
another was a trespass, regardless of any fault on the part of
the one who entered. The tendency has been to repudiate this
doctrine of liability without fault, - subject of course, to the
"extra hazardous activity" exception. 3 It is the duty of the
court to decide as a matter of law whether a given activity, in a
specific factual setting, is or is not extra hazardous.4 The Re-
statement has denominated as "ultrahazardous" iny activity
which involves a risk of harm that cannot be eliminated despite
the utmost care, and a matter not of common usage.5 Although
a number of courts have applied the test to various activities,
its judically defined limits have yet to be completely disclos-
ed. The keeping of explosives, use of exterminating gas 7 oil
well drilling," operation of aircraft,9 and blastingl0 have been
held to be ultrahazardous, thereby imposing liability without
fault.11
1. PROSSER, TORTS 54 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1956); Smith v. Pate, 246
N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934) "Except where the actor is
engaged in an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent
entry on land in the possession of another or causing a thing or third
person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the
possessor, even though the entry caused harm to the possessor or to the
thing or third person in whose security the posse.ssor has a legally pro-
tected interest."
4. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
5. § 520 (1934).
6. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
7. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
8. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
9. Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
10. Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842 (1953).
11. Other underlying social and economic reasons for imposing abso-
lute liability has been to shift the loss to one whose acts have been the
proximate cause of a foreseeable risk; of preventing an actor who has in-
creased the value of his property by a hazardous activity from being un-
justly enriched at the expense of others; and to subject an economically
valuable activity to a degree of responsibility. See generally Comments,
Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Re-
statement Doctrine, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 269 (1949); Freedman, Nuisance Ultra-
hazardous Activities, and the Atomic Reactor, 30 Temp. L.Q. 77 (1957);
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An examination of the cases concerning damage caused by
aerial crop spraying show almost unanimous recovery, 12 gen-
erally upon the theory of negligence. 1 In many cases the spray-
ing operations have been conducted under adverse conditions
or without reasonable care, such as applying chemicals despite
blowing winds1 or failing to turn off the spray while circling
over the plaintiff's land.5 Some courts have upheld a finding
of negligence solely on the basis of damage caused by the
spraying operation, without any mention of careless conduct.-"
These cases which hold spraying, without more, to be negli-
gent produce the same result as strict liability, but the method
of arriving at the result is different. Under the negligence
theory, the risk of doing the act even in the most careful man-
ner is found to outweight the utility, therefore the actor is at
fault. Under strict liability, the court finds that the utility out-
weighs the risk, but the one benefitting from such activity
must pay his way.17 The instant case is the first common-law
jurisdiction to have applied the concept of strict liability for
damage caused by crop spraying. A Louisiana case held ap-
plicable the doctrine of strict liability, but this case is distin-
guishable because based on civil law principles."1
No cases in point have arisen in North Dakota. 1 It is prob-
able that the issue may arise since crop spraying is an import-
ant activity in an agricultural state. To this end the proposed
legislation would be desirable. (1) Enact a statute making ap-
Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and other Mysteries, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 984 (1952).
12. Supra notes 9, 10, 11 and 12.
13. Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949) . one who
uses a dust of this kind 2,4-D is not liable to his neighbors in every case;
negligence must be shown." Park v. Atwood Crop Dusters, 118 Cal. App. 2d
422, 257 P.2d 653 (1953) "The dusting was done under conditions which
would indicate to a reasonable and prudent person that damage to plain-
tiff's crop would result." Lawler v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961). The
appellant has sought recovery upon the theory of absolute liability in cer-
tain cases, but the court has rejected each. See Harris v. United States,
205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); Smith v. Okerson, 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857
(1950) (ground application).
14. Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952); Pitchfork Land
& Cattle Co. v. King, 335 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
15. Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940).
16. Adams v. Henning, 177 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (1953); Ken-
tucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952); Schultz v. Har-
less, 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
17. See Crop Dusting: Legal Problems In a New Industry, 6 Stan. L.
Rev. 69, 79 (1953).
18. Article 677 of the Louisiana Civil Code is patterned after the French
Civil Code which provides that "a person is responsible... for the damage
which is caused... by things which are in his custody." Since the article
does not contain the word "fault" it has been held to impose liability re-
gardless of fault.
19. Cf. Burt v. Lake Region Flying Service, 78 N.D. 928, 54 N.W.2d 339
(1952). The applicator was liable to the employing landowner for crop dam-
age caused by the negligent mixing or application of spray.
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plicators absolutely liable for all crop damage. (2) Require by
statute all applicators to carry adequate liability insurance,
or, in the alternative, to post a bond assuring financial respon-
sibility adequate to cover crop spraying damage.20 In applying
the extra hazardous concept to crop spraying, where such a
concept has not been expressly imposed before, Loe v. Lenhardt
may well become a landmark case.
ORLIN W. BACKES
20. See Note, Liability for Chemical Damage From Aerial Crop Dusting,
43 Minn. L. Rev. 531 (1959).
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